Hassan Sadr, the author of previously unpublished notes on Dr. Mossadegh, is historically important for a number of reasons. He was Dr. Mossadegh’s personal lawyer at various times; represented the country at the International Court of the Hague during the height of the oil nationalization crisis; and he counseled Dr. Mossadegh at the High Appeals Court immediately after the 1953 coup and the infamous “trial” in the rigged military tribunal. Sadr’s notes are important primary sources for understanding Dr. Mossadegh’s thinking—especially about Iranian history, the origins of the oil nationalization campaign, his rejections of the various so-called “compromises” offered by the West, particularly the World Bank, and finally his detailed criticism of the 1954 Oil Consortium Agreement which he dismissed as “negating” the oil nationalization law. These notes not only reflect Mossadegh’s thinking but also reveal much of the behind-the-scenes goings on during the court trials—the stringent restrictions put on defense lawyers as well as the prosecutors’ failed attempts to sow dissension between Mossadegh and his former ministers. Some of this information has not been revealed before.

Sadr was important in his own right. In 1943 he launched a weekly named Qiyam-e Iran (Iran’s Uprising) which continued to appear until 1954 when it was closed down because of its opposition to the Consortium Agreement. Sadr was not only a staunch Mossadegh supporter, but at various times enjoyed access to Ayatollah Kashani, General Zahedi, and the Tudeh Party. What is more, in the highly contested 17th Majles elections in 1952, he stood as a pro-National Front candidate in Isfahan. The government stopped the voting, including in Isfahan, once enough deputies had been elected to form a parliamentary quorum on the grounds of increasing violence and blatant intervention by the military, the royal court, and, “foreign powers.” The recent release of US State Department documents reveal for the first time that the CIA played a significant role in these elections—by financing newspapers and candidates. Although the documents do not reveal names, one can be sure Hassan Sadr was not one of them. (US State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Iran, 1951-54 (Government Printing House: Washington, DC, 2017).